COMP4DRONES - User contributions [en]

WP6-02

2023-11-27T12:31:05Z

Ait:

= ThreatGet – Post- / Precondition =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-02
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Windows, Enterprise Architect, SysML model
|-
| Provide || Threat Analysis and Risk Management.
|-
| Input || SysML model
|-
| Output || Threat Analysis and Risk Assesment, Report
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4 (for application to Drone Systems)
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|-
| URL || https://www.threatget.com/

|}

ThreatGet offers an automated security (threat) analysis and supports risk managements. This is based on a model of the system and a database of relevant threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The system model is analyzed, potential threats are identified and guidance for threat treatment is provided. For certification the tool offers a report function.

== Detailed Description ==
The AIT Security Analysis Tool can be used as analysis tool to identify security issues in a design and verification toolchain and also to provide input for security testing and analysis. An overview of interactions is shown in in the following figure.

[[File:AIT_TG_Placement_and_Interaction_Toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| Placement and Interaction of AIT Security Analysis tool in toolchain]]

The model in the tool can be based either on a informal description of a system (e.g. developed from scratch) or based on an already existing system model (e.g. formal description). In the case of a formal description there is the potential to ensure traceability between the existing model and the model for the security analysis. Outcome of the analysis are:

# A list of potential risks and attacks, where likelihood and impact can be rated to enable risk assessment.
# Based on the risks, security measures can be assigned and used as input for further design and development. Either the security measures can be directly defined in the model, or a requirement document can be defined.
# Identified risks and attacks can also be used as input for security testing and verification.

==Contribution and Improvements==
In context of Comp4Drones ThreatGet focuses on an analysis of potential drone usage scenarios and architectures to identify potential security risks and evaluate mitigation measures. For this AIT developed a drone-specific Toolbox. The Toolbox consists of a set of Drone and UAV-domain specific elements, which are divided into generic elements and more specific sub-elements as shown in the following figure.

[[File:AIT_UAV_Toolbox.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| UAV Toolbox]]

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

While the AIT Security Analysis utilizes an enhanced Dataflow Diagram / Architecture Model for the threat analysis, there is a possibility to connect this model with traces to an SysML Model and interact with other SysML based Tools. In addition to that risk identified and requirements defined can be exchanged with requirement management tools, e.g. Excel, XML, RIF/ReqIF. An asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow [https://c4d.lias-lab.fr/index.php/WP6-01 AIT Workflow] was developed for extended analysis options for the system models.

[[File:AIT_TG_toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| AIT Security Analysis Tool Toolchain]]

WP6-02

2022-10-14T07:28:24Z

Ait: Created page with "= ThreatGet – Post- / Precondition = {|class="wikitable" | ID|| WP6-02 |- | Contributor || AIT |- | Levels || Tool |- | Require || Windows, Enterprise Architect, SysML model |- | Provide || Threat Analysis and Risk Management. |- | Input || SysML model |- | Output || Threat Analysis and Risk Assesment, Report |- | C4D tooling || n.a. |- | TRL || 4 (for application to Drone Systems) |- | License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic |- | URL..."

= ThreatGet – Post- / Precondition =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-02
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Windows, Enterprise Architect, SysML model
|-
| Provide || Threat Analysis and Risk Management.
|-
| Input || SysML model
|-
| Output || Threat Analysis and Risk Assesment, Report
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4 (for application to Drone Systems)
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|-
| URL || https://www.threatget.com/

|}

ThreatGet offers an automated security (threat) analysis and supports risk managements. This is based on a model of the system and a database of relevant threats, weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The system model is analyzed, potential threats are identified and guidance for threat treatment is provided. For certification the tool offers a report function.

== Detailed Description ==
The AIT Security Analysis Tool can be used as analysis tool to identify security issues in a design and verification toolchain and also to provide input for security testing and analysis. An overview of interactions is shown in in the following figure.

[[File:AIT_TG_Placement_and_Interaction_Toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| Placement and Interaction of AIT Security Analysis tool in toolchain]]

The model in the tool can be based either on a informal description of a system (e.g. developed from scratch) or based on an already existing system model (e.g. formal description). In the case of a formal description there is the potential to ensure traceability between the existing model and the model for the security analysis. Outcome of the analysis are:

# A list of potential risks and attacks, where likelihood and impact can be rated to enable risk assessment.
# Based on the risks, security measures can be assigned and used as input for further design and development. Either the security measures can be directly defined in the model, or a requirement document can be defined.
# Identified risks and attacks can also be used as input for security testing and verification.

==Contribution and Improvements==
In context of Comp4Drones ThreatGet focuses on an analysis of potential drone usage scenarios and architectures to identify potential security risks and evaluate mitigation measures. For this AIT developed a drone-specific Toolbox. The Toolbox consists of a set of Drone and UAV-domain specific elements, which are divided into generic elements and more specific sub-elements as shown in the following figure.

[[File:AIT_UAV_Toolbox.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| UAV Toolbox]]

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

While the AIT Security Analysis utilizes an enhanced Dataflow Diagram / Architecture Model for the threat analysis, there is a possibility to connect this model with traces to an SysML Model and interact with other SysML based Tools. In addition to that risk identified and requirements defined can be exchanged with requirement management tools, e.g. Excel, XML, RIF/ReqIF. An asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow [https://c4d.lias-lab.fr/index.php/WP6-03 AIT Workflow] was developed for extended analysis options for the system models.

[[File:AIT_TG_toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| AIT Security Analysis Tool Toolchain]]

File:AIT TG Placement and Interaction Toolchain.png

2022-10-14T07:25:35Z

Ait:

File:AIT UAV Toolbox.png

2022-10-14T07:08:56Z

Ait:

WP6-01

2022-10-10T13:22:15Z

Ait: /* Figure 11: Asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow */

= Asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-01
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Windows, [https://c4d.lias-lab.fr/index.php/WP6-02 AIT Security Analysis Tool]
|-
| Provide || Asset driven cybersecurity workflow.
|}

== Detailed Description ==
An asset-driven analysis approach was introduced in the AIT Security Analysis Tool, the figure below shows the resulting cybersecurity workflow.
[[File:AIT_asset_workflow.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| Asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow]]

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

The Asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow as part of the [https://c4d.lias-lab.fr/index.php/WP6-02 AIT Security Analysis Tool] offers extended analysis options for the SysML models.
[[File:AIT_TG_toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| AIT Security Analysis Tool Toolchain]]

File:AIT TG toolchain.png

2022-10-10T12:59:29Z

Ait:

File:AIT asset workflow.png

2022-10-10T12:59:18Z

Ait:

WP6-01

2022-10-10T12:58:47Z

Ait: /* Detailed Description */

= Figure 11: Asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-01
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Windows, ThreatGet
|-
| Provide ||Asset driven cybersecurity workflow.
|}

== Detailed Description ==

https://c4d.lias-lab.fr/index.php/WP6-02

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

WP6-01

2022-10-10T12:57:56Z

Ait: Created page with "= Figure 11: Asset driven Cybersecurity Workflow = {|class="wikitable" | ID|| WP6-01 |- | Contributor || AIT |- | Levels || Tool |- | Require || Windows, ThreatGet |- | Provide ||Asset driven cybersecurity workflow. |} == Detailed Description == == Interoperability with other C4D tools =="

WP6 Tools Table

2022-10-10T12:53:29Z

Ait:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Tool Name
! ID
! Partner
! User Requirements
! Acceptance Testing
! Data Analytics
! Mission Planning
! System Requirements
! Design
! Implementation
! Integration
! Testing (Verification)
! Validation
! IPR
! Initial TRL
! Expected TRL
! Other
|-
!style="text-align: center;" colspan="17"| '''System Modelling and Code Generation Tools'''
|-
| Modelling & Simulation Tool
|[[WP6-06]]
| BUT
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Open-Source BSD-3
|
|
|
|-
| Mission design and optimization
|[[WP6-07]]
| BUT
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CL
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| OODK
|[[WP6-13]]
| UNIMORE
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
|
|
| Open-Source (BSD-Like)
| 4
| 6
|
|-
| MDC
|[[WP6-15]]
| UNISS
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
| Open-Source BSD-3
| 3
| 4
|
|-
| HEPSYCODE
|[[WP6-17]]
| UNIVAQ
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
| Academic Licensing
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| ESDE
|[[WP6-20]]
| ACORDE
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 1-3
| 5
|
|-
| Papyrus for Robotics
|[[WP6-24]]
| CEA
| X
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
|
| Eclipse (EPL v2.0)
| 3-4
| 5-6
|
|-
| S3D
|[[WP6-25]]
| UNICAN
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
|
Academic Licensing for research
End User Licensing for commercial use
| 5
| 6
|
|-
| DronePort design tool
|[[WP6-27]]
| SM
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
| Open source
| 1
| 5
|
|-
!style="text-align: center;" colspan="17"| System Validation and Verification Tools
|-
| Workflow
|[[WP6-01]]
| AIT
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| MoMuT Protocol Testing
|[[WP6-03]]
| AIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
|
| Proprietary; Academic
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| Testing Tool Set
|[[WP6-04]]
| BUT
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Open-Source (BSD-Like)
| 3
| 5
|
|-
| DronePort Simulation Extensions for Gazebo
|[[WP6-09]]
| UWB
| X
|
|
| X
| X
|
| X
| X
| X
|
| Open Source
| 2
| 5
|
|-
| Paparazzi UAV
|[[WP6-10]]
| ENAC
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
| X
| GPLv2 LGPLv2
| 6
| 6
|
|-
| AirMPL
|[[WP6-14]]
| UNISANNIO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Open source
|
|
|
|-
| SAGE
|[[WP6-16]]
| UNISS
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
| X
|
| LGPL v.3
| 2/3
| 4
|
|-
| SelfTestTool
|[[WP6-22]]
| IKERLAN
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 2
| 5
|
|-
| AsyncCommsTool
|[[WP6-23]]
| IKERLAN
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 4
| 5
|
|-
| Sherpa drone simulator
|[[WP6-28]]
| SHERPA
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Open source (Academic)
| 3
| 3
|
|-
| Framework and toolkit for validation of robustness of path management for multi-path communication system
|[[WP6-18]]
| ANYWI
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 3
| 5
|
|-
| Framework and toolkit for validation of APIs for collection of connection metadata of multi-path communication system
|[[WP6-19]]
| ANIWY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 3
| 5
|
|-
!style="text-align: center;" colspan="17"| System Analysis and Optimization Tools
|-
| ThreatGet – Post- / Precondition
|[[WP6-02]]
| AIT
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
|
| Proprietary
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| Safety Analysis Tool
|[[WP6-08]]
| BUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
|
| Academic Licensing
| 4
| 4
|
|-
| Big Data analytics tool
|[[WP6-05]]
| BUT
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Academic Licensing
| 1
| 4
|
|-
| Simcenter Amesim
|[[WP6-11]]
| Siemens
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 8
| 9
|
|-
| MoSART
|[[WP6-12]]
| ENSMA
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|-
| IPS-MAF
|[[WP6-21]]
| ACORDE
|
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
| X
| Proprietary
| 1
| 4
|
|-
| SoSIM
|[[WP6-26]]
| UNICAN
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
| X
| Academic Licensing for research
End User Licensing for commercial use
| 5
| 6
|
|-
| ROS1 & ROS2 infrastructure/dev-ops
|[[WP6-32]]
| ALM
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
|
| BSD
| 5
| 6
|
|-
| Cloud-based simulation environment
|[[WP6-33]]
| ALM
| X
| X
| X
| X
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| T.B.D. Mainly Open-Source (Apache 2.0)
| 4
| 5
|
|-
| SATB
|[[WP6-29]]
| ALTRAN
| X
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| .
| 0
| 4
|
|-
| e-Handbook
|[[WP6-30]]
| ALTRAN
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
| X
| X
| .
| 0
| 4
|
|-
| HEPSIM2
| [[WP6-34]]
| UNIVAQ
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
|
| Academic Licensing
| 2
| 4
|
|-
|}

WP6-03

2022-10-04T14:00:25Z

Ait:

= Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-MoMuT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model
|-
| Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite.
|-
| Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface
|-
| Output || Test suite
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|-
| URL || https://momut.org/

|}

MoMuT is a model based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. Non-functional aspects include safety invariants and robustness testing ([1][2][3][4]).

== Detailed Description ==
MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages).

For functional test- case generation, it uses mutation-based test- case generation, where a behaviour model is slightly changed (= mutated) and test cases are searched that would allow to discriminate the original and the mutant by the outside behaviour. The change might e.g. be a modified operator or a literal used. The concept is sketched in the following figure.

[[File:MoMuT_tcg.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| Mutation based test case generation.]]

Non-functional aspects that can be addressed are:
* safety invariants (by checking condition during exploration)
* robustness (via smart fuzzing on top of generated tests)
* performance (if a learned cost predictor can be derived)

==Contribution and Improvements==
In the project, AIT improved support for testing communication protocols driven by the needs of evaluating the correctness of an implementation of a key exchange protocol.
The toolchain proposed by AIT to address UC5 is a model-based test case generation framework, whereby we create a model of the protocol to test, run the model-based mutation testing tool and then use the test to verify the protocol implementation. The main tools involved are Papyrus for the modelling, MoMuT for the test-case generation from the model and finally a test-adapter to run the tests against the protocol implementation.

[[File:MoMuT_toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| MoMuT toolchain]]

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

Models to be used as input for MoMuT can be in different formats and formalisms e.g. UML (in Eclipse Papyrus or SparxSystems Enterprise Architect format), a MoMuT specific textual format or a domain specific language. If Papyrus UML is used, this should be compatible/integrable with models for Papyrus4Robotics. This could also lead to interoperation with the security analysis tool.

[[File:MoMuT_Inperoperability.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| MoMuT tool interoperability graph]]

==References==

[1] MoMuT::UML model-based mutation testing for UML. Aichernig, B, et al. 2015. 2015 ieee 8th international conference on Software testing, verification and validation (icst). p. 1-8.

[2] Mapping UML to labeled transition systems for test-case generation: a translation via object-oriented action systems. Krenn, W, Schlick, R and Aichernig, B. K. Berlin, Heidelberg : s.n., 2010. Proceedings of the 8th international conference on formal methods for components and objects. pp. 186–207.

[3] Fellner, Andreas, Tarrach, Thorsten and Weissenbacher, Georg. Language Inclusion for Finite Prime Event Structures. VMCAI. s.l. : Springer, 2020, Vol. 11990, pp. 314-336.

[4] Fellner, Andreas , et al. Model-based, Mutation-driven Test-case Generation Via Heuristic-guided Branching Search. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 2019.

File:MoMuT toolchain.png

2022-10-04T13:52:20Z

Ait: Ait uploaded a new version of File:MoMuT toolchain.png

WP6-03

2022-10-04T13:50:55Z

Ait:

= Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-MoMuT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model
|-
| Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite.
|-
| Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface
|-
| Output || Test suite
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|-
| URL || https://momut.org/

|}

MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages) ([1][2][3][4]).

== Detailed Description ==
MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages).

For functional test- case generation, it uses mutation-based test- case generation, where a behaviour model is slightly changed (= mutated) and test cases are searched that would allow to discriminate the original and the mutant by the outside behaviour. The change might e.g. be a modified operator or a literal used. The concept is sketched in the following figure.

[[File:MoMuT_tcg.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| Mutation based test case generation.]]

Non-functional aspects that can be addressed are:
* safety invariants (by checking condition during exploration)
* robustness (via smart fuzzing on top of generated tests)
* performance (if a learned cost predictor can be derived)

==Contribution and Improvements==
In the project, AIT improved support for testing communication protocols driven by the needs of evaluating the correctness of an implementation of a key exchange protocol.
The toolchain proposed by AIT to address UC5 is a model-based test case generation framework, whereby we create a model of the protocol to test, run the model-based mutation testing tool and then use the test to verify the protocol implementation. The main tools involved are Papyrus for the modelling, MoMuT for the test-case generation from the model and finally a test-adapter to run the tests against the protocol implementation.

[[File:MoMuT_toolchain.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| MoMuT toolchain]]

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

Models to be used as input for MoMuT can be in different formats and formalisms e.g. UML (in Eclipse Papyrus or SparxSystems Enterprise Architect format), a MoMuT specific textual format or a domain specific language. If Papyrus UML is used, this should be compatible/integrable with models for Papyrus4Robotics. This could also lead to interoperation with the security analysis tool.

[[File:MoMuT_Inperoperability.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| MoMuT tool interoperability graph]]

==References==

[1] MoMuT::UML model-based mutation testing for UML. Aichernig, B, et al. 2015. 2015 ieee 8th international conference on Software testing, verification and validation (icst). p. 1-8.

[2] Mapping UML to labeled transition systems for test-case generation: a translation via object-oriented action systems. Krenn, W, Schlick, R and Aichernig, B. K. Berlin, Heidelberg : s.n., 2010. Proceedings of the 8th international conference on formal methods for components and objects. pp. 186–207.

[3] Fellner, Andreas, Tarrach, Thorsten and Weissenbacher, Georg. Language Inclusion for Finite Prime Event Structures. VMCAI. s.l. : Springer, 2020, Vol. 11990, pp. 314-336.

[4] Fellner, Andreas , et al. Model-based, Mutation-driven Test-case Generation Via Heuristic-guided Branching Search. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 2019.

File:MoMuT toolchain.png

2022-10-04T13:45:28Z

Ait:

WP6-03

2022-10-04T13:45:05Z

Ait:

= Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-MoMuT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model
|-
| Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite.
|-
| Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface
|-
| Output || Test suite
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|-
| URL || https://momut.org/

|}

MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages). ([1][2][3][4]).

== Detailed Description ==
MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages).

For functional test- case generation, it uses mutation-based test- case generation, where a behaviour model is slightly changed (= mutated) and test cases are searched that would allow to discriminate the original and the mutant by the outside behaviour. The change might e.g. be a modified operator or a literal used. The concept is sketched in the following figure.

[[File:MoMuT_tcg.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| Mutation based test case generation.]]

Non-functional aspects that can be addressed are:
* safety invariants (by checking condition during exploration)
* robustness (via smart fuzzing on top of generated tests)
* performance (if a learned cost predictor can be derived)

==Contribution and Improvements==
In the project, we will improve support for testing communication protocols driven by the needs of evaluating the correctness of an implementation of a key exchange protocol.

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

Models to be used as input for MoMuT can be in different formats and formalisms e.g. UML (in Eclipse Papyrus or SparxSystems Enterprise Architect format), a MoMuT specific textual format or a domain specific language. If Papyrus UML is used, this should be compatible/integrable with models for Papyrus4Robotics. This could also lead to interoperation with the security analysis tool.

[[File:MoMuT_Inperoperability.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| MoMuT tool interoperability graph]]

==References==

[1] MoMuT::UML model-based mutation testing for UML. Aichernig, B, et al. 2015. 2015 ieee 8th international conference on Software testing, verification and validation (icst). p. 1-8.

[2] Mapping UML to labeled transition systems for test-case generation: a translation via object-oriented action systems. Krenn, W, Schlick, R and Aichernig, B. K. Berlin, Heidelberg : s.n., 2010. Proceedings of the 8th international conference on formal methods for components and objects. pp. 186–207.

[3] Fellner, Andreas, Tarrach, Thorsten and Weissenbacher, Georg. Language Inclusion for Finite Prime Event Structures. VMCAI. s.l. : Springer, 2020, Vol. 11990, pp. 314-336.

[4] Fellner, Andreas , et al. Model-based, Mutation-driven Test-case Generation Via Heuristic-guided Branching Search. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 2019.

WP6-03

2022-10-04T13:40:36Z

Ait: /* Detailed Description */

= Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing =
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-MoMuT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model
|-
| Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite.
|-
| Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface
|-
| Output || Test suite
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|-
| URL || https://momut.org/

|}

MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages). ([1][2][3][4]).

== Detailed Description ==
MoMuT is a model-based testing tool addressing functional and non-functional test-case generation from behaviour models. It can work from several different input modelling languages (e.g. UML and domain specific languages).

For functional test- case generation, it uses mutation-based test- case generation, where a behaviour model is slightly changed (= mutated) and test cases are searched that would allow to discriminate the original and the mutant by the outside behaviour. The change might e.g. be a modified operator or a literal used. The concept is sketched in the following figure.

==Contribution and Improvements==

== Interoperability with other C4D tools ==

Models to be used as input for MoMuT can be in different formats and formalisms e.g. UML (in Eclipse Papyrus or SparxSystems Enterprise Architect format), a MoMuT specific textual format or a domain specific language. If Papyrus UML is used, this should be compatible/integrable with models for Papyrus4Robotics. This could also lead to interoperation with the security analysis tool.

[[File:MoMuT_Inperoperability.png|600px|thumb|frame|center| MoMuT tool interoperability graph]]

==References==

[1] MoMuT::UML model-based mutation testing for UML. Aichernig, B, et al. 2015. 2015 ieee 8th international conference on Software testing, verification and validation (icst). p. 1-8.

[2] Mapping UML to labeled transition systems for test-case generation: a translation via object-oriented action systems. Krenn, W, Schlick, R and Aichernig, B. K. Berlin, Heidelberg : s.n., 2010. Proceedings of the 8th international conference on formal methods for components and objects. pp. 186–207.

[3] Fellner, Andreas, Tarrach, Thorsten and Weissenbacher, Georg. Language Inclusion for Finite Prime Event Structures. VMCAI. s.l. : Springer, 2020, Vol. 11990, pp. 314-336.

[4] Fellner, Andreas , et al. Model-based, Mutation-driven Test-case Generation Via Heuristic-guided Branching Search. ACM Trans. Embed. Comput. Syst. 2019.

File:MoMuT tcg.png

2022-10-04T13:39:22Z

Ait:

WP6-03

2022-10-04T13:18:42Z

Ait:

File:MoMuT Inperoperability.png

2022-10-04T13:14:54Z

Ait: MoMuT tool interoperability graph

== Summary ==
MoMuT tool interoperability graph

WP6-03

2022-10-04T13:14:11Z

Ait:

WP6-03

2022-10-04T13:01:28Z

Ait:

== Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing ==
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-MoMuT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model
|-
| Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite.
|-
| Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface
|-
| Output || Test suite
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4
|-
| License || Commercial, Non-Commercial, Academic
|}

WP6-03

2022-10-04T12:54:13Z

Ait: Created page with "= Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing {|class="wikitable" | ID|| WP6-MoMuT |- | Contributor || AIT |- | Levels || Tool |- | Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model |- | Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite. |- | Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface |- | Output || Test suite |- | C4D tooling || n.a. |- | TRL || 4 |}"

= Model-based Mutation Testing - Protocol Testing
{|class="wikitable"
| ID|| WP6-MoMuT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| Levels || Tool
|-
| Require || Linux, Windows, UML/Event-B/OOAS model
|-
| Provide || Generation of a set of test cases and provides feedback about the quality of the existing test suite.
|-
| Input || UML/Event-B/OOAS model, testinterface
|-
| Output || Test suite
|-
| C4D tooling || n.a.
|-
| TRL || 4
|}

WP6 Tools Table

2022-10-04T12:43:46Z

Ait:

{| class="wikitable"
|-
! Tool Name
! ID
! Partner
! User Requirements
! Acceptance Testing
! Data Analytics
! Mission Planning
! System Requirements
! Design
! Implementation
! Integration
! Testing (Verification)
! Validation
! IPR
! Initial TRL
! Expected TRL
! Other
|-
!style="text-align: center;" colspan="17"| '''System Modelling and Code Generation Tools'''
|-
| Modelling & Simulation Tool
|[[WP6-06]]
| BUT
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Open-Source BSD-3
|
|
|
|-
| Mission design and optimization
|[[WP6-07]]
| BUT
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
| CL
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| OODK
|[[WP6-13]]
| UNIMORE
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
|
|
| Open-Source (BSD-Like)
| 4
| 6
|
|-
| MDC
|[[WP6-15]]
| UNISS
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
| Open-Source BSD-3
| 3
| 4
|
|-
| HEPSYCODE
|[[WP6-17]]
| UNIVAQ
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
| Academic Licensing
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| ESDE
|[[WP6-20]]
| ACORDE
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 1-3
| 5
|
|-
| Papyrus for Robotics
|[[WP6-24]]
| CEA
| X
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
|
| Eclipse (EPL v2.0)
| 3-4
| 5-6
|
|-
| S3D
|[[WP6-25]]
| UNICAN
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
|
Academic Licensing for research
End User Licensing for commercial use
| 5
| 6
|
|-
| DronePort design tool
|[[WP6-27]]
| SM
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
| Open source
| 1
| 5
|
|-
!style="text-align: center;" colspan="17"| System Validation and Verification Tools
|-
| Workflow Engine
|[[WP6-01]]
| AIT
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| MoMuT Protocol Testing
|[[WP6-03]]
| AIT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
|
| Proprietary; Academic
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| Testing Tool Set
|[[WP6-04]]
| BUT
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Open-Source (BSD-Like)
| 3
| 5
|
|-
| DronePort Simulation Extensions for Gazebo
|[[WP6-09]]
| UWB
| X
|
|
| X
| X
|
| X
| X
| X
|
| Open Source
| 2
| 5
|
|-
| Paparazzi UAV
|[[WP6-10]]
| ENAC
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
| X
| GPLv2 LGPLv2
| 6
| 6
|
|-
| AirMPL
|[[WP6-14]]
| UNISANNIO
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Open source
|
|
|
|-
| SAGE
|[[WP6-16]]
| UNISS
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
| X
|
| LGPL v.3
| 2/3
| 4
|
|-
| SelfTestTool
|[[WP6-22]]
| IKERLAN
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 2
| 5
|
|-
| AsyncCommsTool
|[[WP6-23]]
| IKERLAN
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 4
| 5
|
|-
| Sherpa drone simulator
|[[WP6-28]]
| SHERPA
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Open source (Academic)
| 3
| 3
|
|-
| Framework and toolkit for validation of robustness of path management for multi-path communication system
|[[WP6-18]]
| ANYWI
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 3
| 5
|
|-
| Framework and toolkit for validation of APIs for collection of connection metadata of multi-path communication system
|[[WP6-19]]
| ANIWY
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 3
| 5
|
|-
!style="text-align: center;" colspan="17"| System Analysis and Optimization Tools
|-
| ThreatGet – Post- / Precondition
|[[WP6-02]]
| AIT
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
|
|
|
| Proprietary
| 2
| 4
|
|-
| Safety Analysis Tool
|[[WP6-08]]
| BUT
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
|
| Academic Licensing
| 4
| 4
|
|-
| Big Data analytics tool
|[[WP6-05]]
| BUT
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Academic Licensing
| 1
| 4
|
|-
| Simcenter Amesim
|[[WP6-11]]
| Siemens
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| Proprietary
| 8
| 9
|
|-
| MoSART
|[[WP6-12]]
| ENSMA
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|-
| IPS-MAF
|[[WP6-21]]
| ACORDE
|
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
| X
| Proprietary
| 1
| 4
|
|-
| SoSIM
|[[WP6-26]]
| UNICAN
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
|
| X
| Academic Licensing for research
End User Licensing for commercial use
| 5
| 6
|
|-
| ROS1 & ROS2 infrastructure/dev-ops
|[[WP6-32]]
| ALM
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
|
| BSD
| 5
| 6
|
|-
| Cloud-based simulation environment
|[[WP6-33]]
| ALM
| X
| X
| X
| X
|
| X
| X
| X
| X
| X
| T.B.D. Mainly Open-Source (Apache 2.0)
| 4
| 5
|
|-
| SATB
|[[WP6-29]]
| ALTRAN
| X
| X
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| .
| 0
| 4
|
|-
| e-Handbook
|[[WP6-30]]
| ALTRAN
|
|
|
|
| X
|
|
|
| X
| X
| .
| 0
| 4
|
|-
| HEPSIM2
| [[WP6-34]]
| UNIVAQ
|
|
|
|
|
|
| X
| X
|
|
| Academic Licensing
| 2
| 4
|
|-
|}

WP5-16-AIT

2022-07-19T09:32:32Z

Ait: /* Cryptographic algorithms adapted for drones */

=Cryptographic algorithms adapted for drones=
{|class="wikitable"
| Identifier || WP5-16-AIT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| License || Functional
|-
| TRL|| 4
|-
| Description || This component represents a collection of cryptographic primitives and protocols whose characteristics are tailored to the use within drone environments (resource consumption, latency). In particular, the cryptographic protocols while providing means to satisfy low latency requirements will at the same time provide strong security guarantees (like full forward secrecy). Another important focus will be to provide long-term security and in particular resilience to quantum computers, i.e., post-quantum security, and privacy protection of the entities involved in a communication.
|-
| Key Enabling Technology || KET: Security — CATEGORY: U-Space Capabilities, KET: Network Centric Communications Systems — CATEGORY: System Functions
|-
| U-Space Capabilities || “U1: Communication, navigation and surveillance” and “U3: U-space Advanced Services”. This component can be integrated and used by drone manufacturers for general remote communication, as well as V2I and V2V communications, since in the communication-layer the component is located below the standardized and commonly used “TLS” communication layer.
|-
| System Functions || “Communication / Network Centric Communications”: The SW-component provides functionality for secure channel establishment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of messages between two communicating entities by means of a key exchange mechanism with strong security and privacy features. Moreover, with respect to entity authentication it enables unilateral or mutual authentication of communication partners within the secure channel establishment and additionally provides a means for privacy-friendly entity authentication.
|-
| CD4 objectives (O), success criteria (SC), and measurable outcomes (MO) || O3 / SC3.1: Reduction of cybersecurity risks of drone-to-x communications, MO3.3: Mechanisms for secure communications
|-
| Improvement || State-of-the-art cryptographic protocols do not provide low latency as well as strong security properties such as full forward secrecy at the same time. Currently, available protocols are no means to support privacy-friendly authentication. Moreover, they lack security in the face of powerful quantum computers. All these aspects are considered within this component, improving significantly over the state-of-the-art.
|-
| Task || T5.3
|-
| Use Case || UC5 — Agriculture
|-
| Demonstrator || D2 — Wine production
|}

= Architecture context and interfaces =

The AIT component does not represent a stand-alone module but can be viewed as being located within the “VehicleCom” and “GroundCom” modules, i.e., the modules in charge of the communication between vehicles or between vehicles and the ground station and adds security features to the communication (confidentiality, authenticity, privacy).

[[File:wp5-16-ait.png|frame|Architecture context of the component WP5-16-AIT]]

The component can be viewed as a collection of libraries implementing protocols (e.g., secure channel establishment with strong security or privacy-friendly entity authentication) and typically replaces or augments other existing cryptographic primitives (e.g., basic mechanisms in the transport layer security (TLS) protocol). It runs on the Vehicle (VehicleCom), where it is intended to be used together with the “Secure Element” (SE) module to provide stronger security features (i.e., realize secret key operations within the SE). It also runs on the GroundStation and in combination it is possible for the Vehicle and the GroundStation to establish a secure communication (confidential and authenticated).

The core features our component was focusing on can be summarized as follows:

(Low-latency) Key-exchange protocols: Our key-exchange protocols to achieve low latency (zero round-trip time, 0-RTT) together with strong security properties are built upon so called puncturable encryption schemes (or key encapsulation mechanisms).

Privacy-preserving authentication: Depending on the required degree of privacy (only with respect to eavesdroppers or even communication partners like the base station), we focused on protocols either obtained from anonymous (authenticated) key-exchange protocols or primitives underlying anonymous attribute-based credentials or group signature schemes.

= Internals and technologies =
For the implementation of our component, we require a few external libraries:

A pairing implementation, for which we rely on the popular and highly optimized open-source pairing library RELIC6. This choice is done for multiple reasons: (1) it includes implementation of currently recommended pairing-friendly curves such as BLS12-381, (2) includes optimizations for desktop and server CPUs as well as embedded CPUs such as ARM and AVR processors, and (3) allows to configure memory handling suitable for the target platform.

The pyrelic library7 which provides Python bindings for the popular and highly optimized open-source pairing library RELIC.

OpenSSL8, as one of the most used libraries for TLS which also provides TLS 1.3 support.

Our library that implements the secure channel establishment has finally been integrated into OpenSSL and our library for privacy-preserving authentication has been integrated into the pyrelic library. More details can be found in Deliverables D5.5 and D5.6.

As our evaluation platform we use a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B powered by a quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 1200 MHz processor and has 1 GB SDRAM.

WP5-16-AIT

2022-07-19T09:31:59Z

Ait: /* Architecture context and interfaces */

=Cryptographic algorithms adapted for drones=
{|class="wikitable"
| Identifier || WP5-16-AIT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| License || Functional
|-
| Expected TRL|| 4
|-
| Description || This component represents a collection of cryptographic primitives and protocols whose characteristics are tailored to the use within drone environments (resource consumption, latency). In particular, the cryptographic protocols while providing means to satisfy low latency requirements will at the same time provide strong security guarantees (like full forward secrecy). Another important focus will be to provide long-term security and in particular resilience to quantum computers, i.e., post-quantum security, and privacy protection of the entities involved in a communication.
|-
| Key Enabling Technology || KET: Security — CATEGORY: U-Space Capabilities, KET: Network Centric Communications Systems — CATEGORY: System Functions
|-
| U-Space Capabilities || “U1: Communication, navigation and surveillance” and “U3: U-space Advanced Services”. This component can be integrated and used by drone manufacturers for general remote communication, as well as V2I and V2V communications, since in the communication-layer the component is located below the standardized and commonly used “TLS” communication layer.
|-
| System Functions || “Communication / Network Centric Communications”: The SW-component provides functionality for secure channel establishment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of messages between two communicating entities by means of a key exchange mechanism with strong security and privacy features. Moreover, with respect to entity authentication it enables unilateral or mutual authentication of communication partners within the secure channel establishment and additionally provides a means for privacy-friendly entity authentication.
|-
| CD4 objectives (O), success criteria (SC), and measurable outcomes (MO) || O3 / SC3.1: Reduction of cybersecurity risks of drone-to-x communications, MO3.3: Mechanisms for secure communications
|-
| Improvement || State-of-the-art cryptographic protocols do not provide low latency as well as strong security properties such as full forward secrecy at the same time. Currently, available protocols are no means to support privacy-friendly authentication. Moreover, they lack security in the face of powerful quantum computers. All these aspects are considered within this component, improving significantly over the state-of-the-art.
|-
| Task || T5.3
|-
| Use Case || UC5 — Agriculture
|-
| Demonstrator || D2 — Wine production
|}

= Architecture context and interfaces =

The AIT component does not represent a stand-alone module but can be viewed as being located within the “VehicleCom” and “GroundCom” modules, i.e., the modules in charge of the communication between vehicles or between vehicles and the ground station and adds security features to the communication (confidentiality, authenticity, privacy).

[[File:wp5-16-ait.png|frame|Architecture context of the component WP5-16-AIT]]

The component can be viewed as a collection of libraries implementing protocols (e.g., secure channel establishment with strong security or privacy-friendly entity authentication) and typically replaces or augments other existing cryptographic primitives (e.g., basic mechanisms in the transport layer security (TLS) protocol). It runs on the Vehicle (VehicleCom), where it is intended to be used together with the “Secure Element” (SE) module to provide stronger security features (i.e., realize secret key operations within the SE). It also runs on the GroundStation and in combination it is possible for the Vehicle and the GroundStation to establish a secure communication (confidential and authenticated).

The core features our component was focusing on can be summarized as follows:

(Low-latency) Key-exchange protocols: Our key-exchange protocols to achieve low latency (zero round-trip time, 0-RTT) together with strong security properties are built upon so called puncturable encryption schemes (or key encapsulation mechanisms).

Privacy-preserving authentication: Depending on the required degree of privacy (only with respect to eavesdroppers or even communication partners like the base station), we focused on protocols either obtained from anonymous (authenticated) key-exchange protocols or primitives underlying anonymous attribute-based credentials or group signature schemes.

= Internals and technologies =
For the implementation of our component, we require a few external libraries:

A pairing implementation, for which we rely on the popular and highly optimized open-source pairing library RELIC6. This choice is done for multiple reasons: (1) it includes implementation of currently recommended pairing-friendly curves such as BLS12-381, (2) includes optimizations for desktop and server CPUs as well as embedded CPUs such as ARM and AVR processors, and (3) allows to configure memory handling suitable for the target platform.

The pyrelic library7 which provides Python bindings for the popular and highly optimized open-source pairing library RELIC.

OpenSSL8, as one of the most used libraries for TLS which also provides TLS 1.3 support.

Our library that implements the secure channel establishment has finally been integrated into OpenSSL and our library for privacy-preserving authentication has been integrated into the pyrelic library. More details can be found in Deliverables D5.5 and D5.6.

As our evaluation platform we use a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B powered by a quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 1200 MHz processor and has 1 GB SDRAM.

File:Wp5-16-ait.png

2022-07-19T09:30:46Z

Ait:

WP5-16-AIT

2022-07-19T09:27:43Z

Ait:

=Cryptographic algorithms adapted for drones=
{|class="wikitable"
| Identifier || WP5-16-AIT
|-
| Contributor || AIT
|-
| License || Functional
|-
| Expected TRL|| 4
|-
| Description || This component represents a collection of cryptographic primitives and protocols whose characteristics are tailored to the use within drone environments (resource consumption, latency). In particular, the cryptographic protocols while providing means to satisfy low latency requirements will at the same time provide strong security guarantees (like full forward secrecy). Another important focus will be to provide long-term security and in particular resilience to quantum computers, i.e., post-quantum security, and privacy protection of the entities involved in a communication.
|-
| Key Enabling Technology || KET: Security — CATEGORY: U-Space Capabilities, KET: Network Centric Communications Systems — CATEGORY: System Functions
|-
| U-Space Capabilities || “U1: Communication, navigation and surveillance” and “U3: U-space Advanced Services”. This component can be integrated and used by drone manufacturers for general remote communication, as well as V2I and V2V communications, since in the communication-layer the component is located below the standardized and commonly used “TLS” communication layer.
|-
| System Functions || “Communication / Network Centric Communications”: The SW-component provides functionality for secure channel establishment to protect the confidentiality and integrity of messages between two communicating entities by means of a key exchange mechanism with strong security and privacy features. Moreover, with respect to entity authentication it enables unilateral or mutual authentication of communication partners within the secure channel establishment and additionally provides a means for privacy-friendly entity authentication.
|-
| CD4 objectives (O), success criteria (SC), and measurable outcomes (MO) || O3 / SC3.1: Reduction of cybersecurity risks of drone-to-x communications, MO3.3: Mechanisms for secure communications
|-
| Improvement || State-of-the-art cryptographic protocols do not provide low latency as well as strong security properties such as full forward secrecy at the same time. Currently, available protocols are no means to support privacy-friendly authentication. Moreover, they lack security in the face of powerful quantum computers. All these aspects are considered within this component, improving significantly over the state-of-the-art.
|-
| Task || T5.3
|-
| Use Case || UC5 — Agriculture
|-
| Demonstrator || D2 — Wine production
|}

= Architecture context and interfaces =

The AIT component does not represent a stand-alone module but can be viewed as being located within the “VehicleCom” and “GroundCom” modules, i.e., the modules in charge of the communication between vehicles or between vehicles and the ground station and adds security features to the communication (confidentiality, authenticity, privacy).

The component can be viewed as a collection of libraries implementing protocols (e.g., secure channel establishment with strong security or privacy-friendly entity authentication) and typically replaces or augments other existing cryptographic primitives (e.g., basic mechanisms in the transport layer security (TLS) protocol). It runs on the Vehicle (VehicleCom), where it is intended to be used together with the “Secure Element” (SE) module to provide stronger security features (i.e., realize secret key operations within the SE). It also runs on the GroundStation and in combination it is possible for the Vehicle and the GroundStation to establish a secure communication (confidential and authenticated).

The core features our component was focusing on can be summarized as follows:

(Low-latency) Key-exchange protocols: Our key-exchange protocols to achieve low latency (zero round-trip time, 0-RTT) together with strong security properties are built upon so called puncturable encryption schemes (or key encapsulation mechanisms).

Privacy-preserving authentication: Depending on the required degree of privacy (only with respect to eavesdroppers or even communication partners like the base station), we focused on protocols either obtained from anonymous (authenticated) key-exchange protocols or primitives underlying anonymous attribute-based credentials or group signature schemes.

= Internals and technologies =
For the implementation of our component, we require a few external libraries:

A pairing implementation, for which we rely on the popular and highly optimized open-source pairing library RELIC6. This choice is done for multiple reasons: (1) it includes implementation of currently recommended pairing-friendly curves such as BLS12-381, (2) includes optimizations for desktop and server CPUs as well as embedded CPUs such as ARM and AVR processors, and (3) allows to configure memory handling suitable for the target platform.

The pyrelic library7 which provides Python bindings for the popular and highly optimized open-source pairing library RELIC.

OpenSSL8, as one of the most used libraries for TLS which also provides TLS 1.3 support.

Our library that implements the secure channel establishment has finally been integrated into OpenSSL and our library for privacy-preserving authentication has been integrated into the pyrelic library. More details can be found in Deliverables D5.5 and D5.6.

As our evaluation platform we use a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B powered by a quad-core ARM Cortex-A53 1200 MHz processor and has 1 GB SDRAM.

WP5-16-AIT

2022-07-19T09:22:23Z

Ait: Created page with "=Cryptographic algorithms adapted for drones= {|class="wikitable" | Identifier || WP5-16-AIT |- | Contributor || AIT |- | License || Functional |- | Expected TRL|| 4 |- | Description || This component represents a collection of cryptographic primitives and protocols whose characteristics are tailored to the use within drone environments (resource consumption, latency). In particular, the cryptographic protocols while providing means to satisfy low latency requir..."

Component repository

2022-07-19T09:04:34Z

Ait: /* Components list */

This repository aims at providing common components usable in different application domains, in particular those covered by project use-cases.

The requirements for using a components will be listed, as well as a documentation on how to use it. The component itself will be hosted by the partner who provides it.

==Components list==

{| class="wikitable"
|ID
|Contributor
|Title
|-
|[[WP3-01]]
|IKERLAN
|Safety function - Pre-Certified SOM
|-
|[[WP3-02]]
|EDI
|Modular SoC-based embedded reference architecture
|-
|[[WP3-03]]
|BUT
|Sensor information algorithms
|-
|[[WP3-04]]
|HIB
|Computer Vision Components for drones
|-
|[[WP3-10]]
|IFAT
|Component for trusted communication
|-
|[[WP3-13]]
|ENAC
|Paparazzi UAV
|-
|[[WP3-14_1]]
|ENSMA
|Collision avoidance and geo-fencing
|-
|[[WP3-14_2]]
|ENSMA
|Distributed control of multi-drone system
|-
|[[WP3-15_1]]
|ACORDE
|UWB based indoor positioning
|-
|[[WP3-15_2]]
|ACORDE
|Multi-antenna GNSS/INS based navigation
|-
|[[WP3-16]]
|SCALIAN
|EZ_Chains Fleet Architecture
|-
|[[WP3-19_1]]
|IMEC
|Hyperspectral payload
|-
|[[WP3-19_2]]
|IMEC
|Hyperspectral image processing
|-
|[[WP3-20]]
|MODIS
|Multi-sensor positioning
|-
|[[WP3-22]]
|UNIMORE
|Onboard Compute Platform Desing Methodology
|-
|[[WP3-24]]
|UNIVAQ
|Efficient digital implementation of controllers
|-
|[[WP3-26]]
|UWB
|Droneport: an autonomous drone battery management system
|-
|[[WP3-28]]
|UNISS
|Accelerator Design Methodology for OOCP
|-
|[[WP3-36_1]]
|UDANET
|Smart and predictive energy management system
|-
|[[WP3-36_2]]
|UDANET
|AI drone system modules
|-
|[[WP3-37]]
|Aitek
|Video and data analytics
|-
|[[WP4-2]]
|SCALIAN
|EZ_Land Precision landing
|-
|[[WP4-5]]
|SCALIAN
|AI detection for clearance
|-
|[[WP4-16]]
|ACORDE
|Enhanced Navigation Software
|-
|[[WP4-10]]
|ALM
|Cooperative Planner
|-
|[[WP4-14]]
|ALM
|Map Enhancement Service
|-
|[[WP4-15]]
|ALM
|Visual Analytics
|-
|[[WP4-17]]
|ACORDE
|Anchor&Tag firmware of the Indoor Positioning System
|-
|[[WP4-18_A]]
|TEKNE
|Drone-Rover Transponder
|-
|[[WP4-20]]
|ALM
|Attractor-based Navigation
|-
|[[WP4-22]]
|ALM
|Shared Reference Frame
|-
|[[WP4-32]]
|SHERPA
|Dynamic control development for navigation and precision landing
|-
|[[WP4-33]]
|UNIVAQ
|Autonomy, cooperation, and awareness
|-
|[[WP4-39]]
|HIB
|Simulated data aggregator supporting intelligent decision in computer vision components
|-
|[[WP4-42]]
|SCALIAN
|AI Stabilization
|-
|[[WP5-03]]
|SCALIAN
|EZ_Com Safe fleet communication
|-
|[[WP5-05_A]]
|TEKNE
|LP-WAN for UAV identification and monitoring
|-
|[[WP5-11_ACO]]
|ACORDE
|Navigation system with anti-jamming and anti-spoofing features
|-
|[[WP5-16-AIT]]
|AIT
|Cryptographic algorithms adapted for drones
|-
|[[WP5-19_ACO]]
|ACORDE
|Robust communication for an improved Indoor Positioning System
|-
|[[WP6-P4R]]
|CEA
|Model driven engineering
|-
|[[WP6-ESDE]]
|ACORDE
|ESL embedded SW Design Environment (ESDE)
|-
|[[WP6-IPS-MAF]]
|ACORDE
|Indoor Positioning System Modelling&Analysis Framework (IPS-MAF)
|-
|[[WP6-17]]
|UNIVAQ
|HW/SW CO-DEsign of HEterogeneous Parallel dedicated Systems (HEPSYCODE)
|-
|[[WP6-34]]
|UNIVAQ
|HEPSYCODE SystemC SIMulator Version 2.0 (HEPSIM2)
|}